Introduction:

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi paid a historic visit to Turkey, during which he met his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, following a rupture that lasted more than a decade. El-Sisi’s visit to Turkey comes after a noticeable improvement in bilateral relations, and following Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo in February 2024, marking his first visit to Egypt since el-Sisi assumed the presidency.

The meeting between the two presidents included convergence on a number of issues, such as halting the war in the Gaza Strip, Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, increasing trade exchange between the two countries, and the signing of 17 agreements to enhance commercial relations between them.

This paper addresses the restoration of relations between the two countries after a previous rupture, the overlapping files between them, and the potential outcomes that this visit may achieve.

A Previous Rupture:

This visit by the Egyptian president follows a prior rupture that lasted more than a decade and escalated to the level of expelling ambassadors. In 2013, Egypt notified the Turkish ambassador in Cairo that he was persona non grata, and Turkey responded in kind. Erdoğan issued hostile statements toward el-Sisi at various times, describing him as a “tyrant” and a “killer,” and continued in many forums to raise the “Rabaa” sign, reflecting the extent to which tensions between the two countries had reached a critical level.

This rupture had multiple causes. Foremost among them was Erdoğan’s position regarding the legitimacy of el-Sisi’s presidency, which he described as an “unacceptable coup,” his reception of members of the Muslim Brotherhood pursued by the Egyptian regime, and his alignment with “Rabaa al-Adawiya.” Additional causes included disagreements over gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea, and Egypt’s cooperation with Greece and Cyprus as states considered adversarial to Turkey in this context. Tensions further escalated due to Turkey’s presence in Libya, which el-Sisi regarded as a threat to national security, warning Ankara against approaching the “Sirte–Jufra axis,” describing it as a “red line” that would not be allowed to be crossed.

All these reasons and factors led to a rupture in relations between the two countries, before both states—particularly Turkey—sought to restore relations and ease tensions, within the framework of a comprehensive Turkish diplomatic campaign aimed at zeroing problems, most notably with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt.

Restoration of Relations:

Relations between the two countries followed a regressive trajectory over the years; however, this did not persist. The two states reached a point at which the deterioration of relations came to a halt, initially driven more by Turkish will than by a fully mutual will. Turkey adopted a general trajectory aimed at improving relations with the countries of the region, particularly Arab states, including Egypt. This led to a halt in the regressive trajectory of bilateral relations, and the initial indicators of restoring relations began to appear gradually within the framework of overlapping interests between the two countries.

Indicators of the Return of Relations:

Relations between the two countries began with the resumption of declared diplomatic contacts in March 2021, followed by the first exploratory talks between foreign ministry officials in May of the same year. The pace of diplomatic coordination then developed, culminating in the first handshake between the Turkish and Egyptian presidents on the sidelines of their attendance at the opening of the 2022 FIFA World Cup on November 20, 2022, which significantly reduced tensions between the two leaders.

This was followed by the visit of the Egyptian Foreign Minister to Ankara on February 27, 2023, to provide support in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in Turkey. Egypt dispatched two aid aircraft and the vessel “Halayeb,” loaded with 650 tons of humanitarian assistance to Turkey. The rapprochement between the two presidents progressed to the point of holding their first summit meeting in New Delhi on the sidelines of the G20 Summit on September 10, 2023, followed two months later by their meeting on the sidelines of the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh. These indicators were recently crowned by Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo approximately half a year ago.

Motivations for Restoring Relations:

The reasons for severing relations between the two countries were closer to being ideological in nature, whereas the reasons for their restoration have been economic and political. Trade exchange between the two countries reached $7.1 billion in 2022, and Turkish investments in Egypt reached $2.5 billion in April 2023. This encourages both countries to create a political environment that supports increasing trade exchange, particularly as Turkey resembles a “trading state” that prioritizes the economic dimension, while Egypt is undergoing difficult economic conditions, prompting it to seek increased trade through the restoration of relations.

The energy and gas sectors also play a prominent role in driving both countries to strengthen relations, as Turkey relies significantly on Egyptian gas due to Russian and Iranian gas being subject to sanctions, pushing Turkey toward Egyptian gas.

Other drivers accelerated the pace of improving relations that had already been planned. Among these drivers is the war in Sudan, which Egypt considers part of its national security, with millions of Sudanese displaced to Egypt, placing a burden on the Egyptian economy. Egypt requires a Turkish role in dealing with the war in Sudan, as well as in the Ethiopia file, which also constitutes a national security threat. Additional overlapping files include Libya, Syria, and shared presence in Somalia.

The war in Gaza constituted the latest and most prominent driver accelerating reconciliation, as both countries seek to avoid any adverse impacts resulting from the ongoing war, which may expand regionally. Egypt represents the closest actor in managing the dynamics of the Palestinian issue alongside Qatar, which explains Turkey’s emphasis on complementarity with Egypt in addressing tensions between Palestine and Israel. This was reinforced by Egyptian-Turkish alignment on the Palestinian issue, as both Cairo and Ankara condemned Israeli military operations, called for an immediate cessation of the war, and agreed on the necessity of a “two-state solution.”

Through these multiple drivers for restoring relations—represented by overlapping files such as the economic and energy files, the Libyan, Syrian, and Palestinian files, the war in Sudan, and potential partnership in Somalia—the reasons behind the rapid restoration of relations become clear. These files also indicate that both countries recognize the importance of rapprochement in achieving their shared interests, allowing us to anticipate sustained relations, future partnerships, and enhanced trust at the highest levels.

Intersection and Overlap:

There are numerous files that represent both convergence and contention between the two countries. These files determine the trajectory of relations—toward either agreement or divergence—and simultaneously serve as both drivers for restoring relations and potential outcomes thereof. The most prominent of these files at the regional level include Libya, the war in Gaza, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, trade exchange, and Eastern Mediterranean gas.

The Libyan File:

Egypt and Turkey have shared influence over the situation in Libya, each playing a prominent role. Egypt supports the forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, active in eastern Libya, while Turkey supports the Government of National Unity in western Libya, represented by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. This competition between the two countries on the Libyan scene persisted for a period, along with differing perspectives.

This divergence also had regional extensions, evident in Egypt’s coordination with Greece—Turkey’s traditional adversary—stemming from disagreements over the Libyan file, particularly following Turkey’s signing of an oil agreement with the Government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli in October 2022.

Similarly, the “Eastern Mediterranean agreement” on maritime boundary delimitation between Turkey and Libya contributed to escalating tensions, as reflected in el-Sisi’s statement on July 20, 2022, considering the “Sirte–Jufra line” a red line.

This phase of divergence was not permanent, as some indicators of convergence began to emerge between Egypt and Turkey regarding the Libyan file, such as agreement on the necessity of holding elections, removing militias present in Libya, and preserving Libya’s unity. Both countries reinforced this convergence during the joint conference in the Egyptian president’s recent visit to Turkey. Additional positive indicators include the shift of eastern Libyan authorities—previously cautious in dealing with Turkey—toward improving relations, exemplified by the visit of Belqasim Haftar to Ankara and his meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, within the framework of Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement.

It appears that Egypt and Turkey are moving toward a shared understanding that may alleviate Libyan suffering and contribute to the establishment of a Libyan state capable of representing its people. However, this is unlikely in the near term due to the presence of other controlling or influential actors in the Libyan scene, such as the United States and Iran. Nevertheless, Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement represents a positive factor serving Libyan interests, even if not to the full extent desired by Libyans, as it at least ensures the prevention of another war among the conflicting parties.

The War on Gaza:

Just as this war has cast its shadows over many countries—affecting them negatively at times and positively at others—it has similarly impacted Turkey and Egypt. This helps explain Erdoğan’s relatively early visit to Cairo within the context of Egyptian-Turkish relations, occurring four months after the outbreak of the war, during which he met with el-Sisi. The Gaza file was the most prominent among the issues discussed during the presidential visit.

The significant impact of the Gaza war on both countries stems from security, economic, and political considerations. The war and the alignment surrounding it were not merely a result of Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement but also a cause of it, as it accelerated rapprochement due to its sensitivity for both countries. Thus, the Gaza war served as a catalyst for rapprochement, while alignment on the issue was reinforced by it.

Like other files, the Gaza war constitutes a window for enhancing Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement. Both countries agree on condemning the aggressive actions of Israeli occupation forces and the necessity of halting the war, and they broadly converge on implementing the two-state solution.

The implications of this rapprochement extend to Israel, whose government does not welcome it and considers it a negative development, both in general—given that the three states are among the region’s most prominent competing powers—and specifically in relation to the Gaza war. This rapprochement may cast a shadow over Israel’s efforts to prolong the war and could, even if relatively, affect its objectives and plans. One of the simplest pathways for such influence is through the expansion of Turkey’s role in shaping the war’s outcome via Egypt, given Egypt’s position as the leading Arab partner in managing the Palestinian issue and negotiations. This is likely to cause concern for Israel, reinforced by Erdoğan’s recent statements threatening intervention in the Gaza war and his remarks referring to “Zionism against Muslims,” alongside his call for forming an Islamic alliance.

Among the most prominent manifestations of coordination between Turkey and Egypt affecting the situation in Gaza is the increase in humanitarian aid delivered by Turkey to the Gaza Strip through Egypt, as Turkey has repeatedly sent assistance to Gaza via Egyptian channels.

The Syrian File:

The Syrian scene is currently characterized by stagnation. As one of the principal actors controlling developments, Turkey maintains a presence in several areas of Syria, including Peace Spring, Afrin, Euphrates Shield, and Idlib, and seeks to manage the situation in a manner that serves its interests. It appears that Turkey has opted for rapprochement with the Syrian regime in order to conclude a phase of attrition and refocus on its domestic and economic priorities, as reflected in Erdoğan’s statements advocating Turkish-Syrian rapprochement.

Through its rapprochement with Egypt, Turkey can leverage Egypt’s relatively closer position to the Syrian regime to support the momentum of Turkish-Syrian rapprochement. Egypt has previously supported such rapprochement and has called for political solutions, even previously urging the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territory. Turkey justifies its presence as necessary for safeguarding its national security, particularly in light of Kurdish presence, which it considers a threat. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime is not in a strong position, making it more inclined toward rapprochement with Turkey in pursuit of potential benefits. However, this process faces obstacles, including Iranian influence, which does not favor ending the conflict or pursuing political solutions, as well as competing external interventions in Syria.

Accordingly, Turkey is likely to rely on Egypt’s role in encouraging the Syrian regime to accept and advance rapprochement, a role Egypt does not oppose, particularly as it has no substantial ambitions in Syria and does not view the file as costly. Supporting such rapprochement may instead serve Egypt’s interest in promoting regional stability.

It can be anticipated that Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement will serve as an important factor accelerating Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, which Turkey will seek to leverage as part of its broader policy of reducing tensions with regional states.

Economic Interests:

Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement comes amid difficult economic conditions in both countries in recent years. Accordingly, the economic factor has played a significant role in advancing rapprochement, given mutual need. Egypt serves as Turkey’s gateway to African markets, while Turkey represents Egypt’s gateway to Europe. This explains the continuity of economic relations despite more than a decade of political rupture.

The importance of the economic factor is further evidenced by el-Sisi’s visit to Ankara, which witnessed the first meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Egypt, originally launched during Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo. The meeting included approximately 36 items, most of which focused on economic cooperation, including improving the investment climate, increasing exports and imports, encouraging new investments, cooperation in projects and entrepreneurship, promoting economic opportunities, and enhancing cooperation in energy, tourism, media, and communications.

Two memoranda of understanding were also signed between the Turkish Polaris company and the Egyptian government to develop two industrial zones in the New Administrative Capital and 6th of October City. The economic crises facing both countries have further reinforced the role of economic considerations in rapprochement.

As such, the economic factor is not only a driver but also an outcome of rapprochement, as this visit is expected to translate into tangible economic cooperation. The two presidents aim to increase trade volume from $10 billion to $15 billion within five years and to explore the use of local currencies in trade to reduce reliance on the US dollar, as reflected in their statements during the visit.

Potential Cooperation:

Given the accelerating pace of bilateral relations, it can be asserted that current cooperation will extend to new and potential areas. Egypt is likely to seek to benefit from Turkey in its complex files related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Horn of Africa, particularly given Turkey’s economic and military presence in the region.

Turkey’s presence enhances Egypt’s interest in leveraging it in both the dam issue and the Somalia file, especially amid tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s activities near Somalia’s borders suggest efforts to access the Red Sea through a port in Somaliland. Egypt’s recent deployment of forces and equipment to Somalia reflects its response to these developments, perceived as threats to national security. Turkey’s role is significant here, given its major military base in Somalia, and it is likely that Egypt’s deployment occurred within an implicit understanding with Turkey.

Turkey also played an important role in supporting the Ethiopian government during its conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Turkey thus appears in a delicate position between Egypt and Ethiopia but is likely to favor Egypt, potentially in exchange for concessions in other files, most notably Egypt’s reconsideration of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Sudan is another potential area of cooperation, as it represents a shared interest. Egypt considers Sudan part of its southern national security, while Turkey may seek to leverage Sudan to restore its presence in the Red Sea. Indicators of Turkish interest appeared in cooperation agreements between Ankara and Khartoum in 2017.

Following the Sudanese crisis in April 2023, Turkey adopted a strong position supporting the Sudanese government and army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who visited Ankara that same year. Both Egypt and Turkey support political and diplomatic solutions to the Sudanese crisis, suggesting the likelihood of expanded cooperation within the framework of ongoing rapprochement and Turkey’s broader strategy to expand its presence in Africa.

Eastern Mediterranean Gas:

Gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean represent one of the most complex issues that may hinder Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement. This energy-rich region has long been a source of dispute involving Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, as well as other actors including Israel, Libya, the United States, and several European countries.

Turkey considers the Eastern Mediterranean basin to fall within its historical, geological, and political domain, asserting maritime boundaries and the sovereign rights of Turkish Cypriots. Conversely, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus view Turkey’s actions as attempts to dominate the island’s gas resources and strengthen its position as a regional energy hub.

Turkey has sent multiple vessels for exploration, beginning on October 30, 2018, with the deployment of the “Fatih” drilling ship. In response, Egypt established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in January 2019, including Israel, Jordan, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy, as a framework for cooperation in maritime delimitation and resource exploitation. Turkey perceived this as an attempt to exclude it from regional resources and continued its exploration activities, including maritime delimitation with Libya in 2022.

This issue is fundamentally geopolitical rather than purely economic, as Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves constitute less than 2% of global reserves. The dispute has taken on an international dimension due to the involvement of major powers.

Recent Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement raises questions regarding its impact on this dispute, maritime boundaries, and the positions of Greece and Cyprus. The visits of Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry to Ankara and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Cairo mark important steps toward resolving disputes.

This rapprochement may extend beyond bilateral and regional levels to international implications, potentially prompting involvement by actors such as the United States in reshaping regional alignments. However, opposition from Greece, Cyprus, and Israel may complicate Egypt’s path toward deeper cooperation with Turkey in this file.

Conclusion:

Based on the above, indicators suggest that Egyptian-Turkish relations are not merely a bilateral development but rather a broader regional shift with implications across multiple files. The trajectory of relations appears to be moving forward, with no indication of a return to tension. Instead, deeper relations and increased mutual trust are expected, as opportunities outweigh challenges.

The visit and rapprochement are likely to yield outcomes across several areas, including enhanced military cooperation—potentially involving Turkish drone supplies to Egypt—energy cooperation in the Mediterranean, coordination in Libya, continued humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and joint efforts to end the war and ensure Israeli withdrawal.

In the Syrian file, Egypt may play a mediating role between Turkey and the Syrian regime to facilitate refugee return and reduce economic burdens on Turkey. Both countries are also expected to play a larger role in Sudan and Somalia, where they share convergent positions in supporting existing governments.

Turkey may also attempt to mediate between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the difficulty of such efforts.

Finally, it is evident that Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement holds broad prospects. The trajectory of rapprochement is advancing steadily through coordinated steps and is likely to reach advanced levels that will produce significant changes across numerous bilateral and regional files.