Introduction:

Yemeni political parties and forces announced the decision to establish the “National Bloc of Political Parties and Components” in the interim capital, Aden, on Tuesday, November 5.

The National Bloc of Political Parties and Components includes 23 parties and political entities that signed the bloc’s founding document, foremost among them the General People’s Congress and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah). The Chairman of the Shura Council, Ahmed Obaid bin Daghr, was selected as the rotating head of the bloc.
This paper examines the general context of the bloc’s formation, the nature of disparities among parties and components, the available opportunities for the bloc, the obstacles it faces, as well as its potential roles.

Previous Attempt:

Establishing a bloc that includes political parties and forces to unify efforts and policies is an important step in the trajectory of state restoration, particularly as the “Houthi group,” supported by the Iranian regime, derives its strength from the fragmentation and disparities among the parties of the internationally recognized government, and relies on these disparities to enhance its influence—something the group has invested in throughout the past decade.
Yemeni political parties and forces recognize that their divergence constitutes a source of strength for the Houthi group; therefore, they seek to develop an umbrella framework under which they can unify their policies and visions and renounce their differences. A previous attempt was made through the establishment of the “National Alliance of Yemeni Political Forces” in April 2019, headed by Rashad Al-Alimi before he became Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council.
The previous attempt did not achieve effective change; rather, it had no tangible role, characterized by a lack of any meaningful activity undertaken by the “National Alliance.” This weak role was entrenched due to several factors, most notably that the conditions of the phase were not conducive to the success of such a step—whether domestically or externally. Additionally, the Southern Transitional Council’s control over Aden, the headquarters of the National Alliance, on August 20, 2019, complicated the alliance’s movements and operations and increased security threats to any activities it sought to undertake. This was compounded by the stagnation of the presidency’s role during President Hadi’s tenure and his absence from the interim capital, Aden.
After a five-year period during which the National Alliance failed to achieve its objectives, the National Bloc emerges as a successor. Current conditions appear more favorable than before, particularly following the transfer of power to the Presidential Leadership Council and the inclusion of various parties under its umbrella in April 2022, the return of the Yemeni government to Aden, a degree of rapprochement among parties and de-escalation between them, and finally, the large number of parties and components that joined the bloc—foremost among them the General People’s Congress and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform.
These more conducive conditions increase the bloc’s chances of undertaking vital actions and avoiding the failure experienced by the previous attempt.

Opportunities and Enablers:

The National Political Bloc represents a highly significant development within Yemen’s complex political landscape. It has emerged amid shifting regional and international conditions, confronting multiple variables while simultaneously benefiting from them. The bloc enjoys opportunities and enablers that may strengthen its position and help it achieve its objectives at a faster pace.
At the international level, the bloc has received clear American acceptance and support, as evidenced by the attendance of U.S. Ambassador Steven Fagin at the inauguration ceremony. This represents a major opportunity, as it provides the necessary political backing to reinforce the bloc against potential pressures or obstacles.
At the regional level, the bloc appears to enjoy Saudi support and endorsement, even if not officially declared. This aligns with Saudi Arabia’s efforts to unify the parties of the internationally recognized government and foster rapprochement among them as part of its broader settlement approach. Saudi efforts are reflected in the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council under its sponsorship, bringing together various political actors, the return of the government to Aden, and numerous initiatives aimed at unifying ranks—indicating its support for the bloc as an extension of these efforts. Moreover, it is in Saudi Arabia’s interest to unify Yemeni political forces to form a strong front against potential insurgencies by the Houthi group.
The return of the government to Aden also constitutes a key opportunity, as it creates favorable conditions for the bloc’s activities and enables political rapprochement under the umbrella of the Presidential Leadership Council. It provides a more suitable environment for the bloc’s movements and facilitates the achievement of its objectives, particularly given the Yemeni government’s support for the bloc, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Ahmed bin Mubarak’s attendance at the launch event and his endorsement of the initiative.
The selection of Ahmed Obaid bin Daghr as rotating head of the bloc has also strengthened its legitimacy, given his broad popularity and recognition across various political actors in Yemen, making him a relatively consensus figure and enhancing acceptance of the bloc.
Additional enablers include the pressing need to address the Houthi threat facing all political entities since the coup. These shared risks constitute a primary driver behind the formation of the bloc, as parties seek to unite under it as a means of confronting this threat.
Furthermore, the bloc’s strong launch, with the participation of 23 parties and components—led by the General People’s Congress and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform—reflects its capacity to mobilize both political and popular support.

Boycott and Concerns:
The announcement of the bloc’s formation has been accompanied by notable boycotts and concerns, particularly in southern Yemen. These objections manifest in refusal to participate, hostile statements, and even threats at their peak levels. While significant, this boycott is unlikely to dissolve or completely halt the bloc’s activities; however, it may obstruct its progress and substantially weaken its role by constraining its movements, potentially leading to early stagnation similar to that of the previous National Alliance.
The boycott is led by the Southern Transitional Council, which has categorically refused to join the bloc and has escalated to issuing warnings that such steps could lead to the collapse of the Presidential Leadership Council and the government. Protests were also organized outside the venue of the bloc’s inauguration ceremony.
The Council justifies its rejection on the grounds that the bloc contradicts its project of “southern independence,” arguing that the bloc seeks to marginalize this objective—particularly as the bloc’s statement affirms support for Yemeni unity, which the Council fundamentally opposes.
The significance of this rejection lies in the Council’s dominant control over Aden, the interim capital and the bloc’s headquarters, meaning the bloc’s operational space is largely under its influence—posing substantial constraints on its activities.
The bloc’s continued operation in such an environment, despite the Council’s opposition, can be explained by the “relative balance” established by Saudi Arabia in Aden following the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council, as well as gradual measures to curb the Council’s dominance. It also suggests that the bloc has received guarantees and support that allow it a limited operational space without direct confrontation.
The Hadramout Inclusive Conference has also announced its boycott, stating that the bloc does not represent Hadramout or its people. This boycott may influence the bloc, given the Conference’s prominence and influence in Hadramout, where it represents a significant segment of public opinion, alongside the Hadramout Organization Council, which joined and supported the bloc.
The importance of this boycott is reflected in the Conference’s popular base and its role as a pressure actor on local authorities and the Presidential Leadership Council. This was evident during President Rashad al-Alimi’s visit to Hadramout on July 27, 2024, which the Conference rejected, describing it as “dangerous,” and issuing warnings regarding oil-related decisions without securing Hadramout’s rights.
In addition to boycotts, concerns have also been raised by the Houthi group, which attempts to frame the bloc as part of a “U.S. role in Yemen” aimed at confronting it. These concerns likely stem from the group’s interest in maintaining fragmentation among government forces, as such divisions have historically weakened its opponents and provided opportunities to expand its control. The Houthis recognize that the bloc’s primary objective is to unify efforts against them and lay the groundwork for state restoration, representing a significant shift in the balance of power.

Future Roles:

The path of the political bloc will not be free of obstacles; it will face numerous challenges due to the nature of the current phase and its inherent conflicts. However, this does not imply inevitable failure. The bloc may still play influential future roles and achieve a significant portion of its objectives.
Among its key goals are restoring the state, unifying national forces to confront the Houthi coup amid the ongoing conflict, and preserving the republican system within a federal state framework. These are ambitious goals that require coordinated efforts between the bloc, the Presidential Leadership Council, the government, and coalition states. The bloc alone cannot achieve them, particularly given its limited on-the-ground influence and lack of coercive power.
One of its declared roles is addressing the southern issue within a final political settlement—a highly complex task, especially given the Southern Transitional Council’s outright rejection and its dominance in southern Yemen, alongside its secessionist agenda.
This fundamental divergence between the bloc and the Council significantly limits the bloc’s ability to perform its roles or advance its objectives, particularly in promoting national unity. Similarly, the boycott by the Hadramout Inclusive Conference adds further complications, weakening the bloc’s capacity to unify efforts among key actors.
The bloc has also committed to supporting the internationally recognized government in implementing its economic program to address economic deterioration and improve services. However, this is a complex challenge, largely tied to the loss of revenue due to war conditions—most notably the suspension of oil exports following Houthi attacks—as well as to the performance of the Presidential Leadership Council and the government, and the need for external economic support.
Despite these economic constraints, the bloc may still contribute positively by encouraging member parties to rationalize expenditures, make concessions, reduce spending, support government economic policies, and ensure the transfer of revenues to the Central Bank of Yemen, leveraging their influence over various governorates.
Ultimately, the bloc represents a potentially influential actor, given its broad representation of major Yemeni political forces, support from the government and Washington, and relatively favorable conditions. However, predicting its definitive role remains difficult due to the significant challenges it faces.

Recommendations:

This paper offers a set of recommendations aimed at enhancing the bloc’s role and effectiveness in the current phase, including:
– Accelerating the establishment and organization of the bloc’s internal structure, as delays may hinder its operational launch and create internal friction.
– Working to accommodate all parties and avoid confrontations within the framework of the internationally recognized government, as early conflicts could weaken the bloc and divert it from its core objectives.
– Initiating balanced and practical measures on the ground, achieving tangible positive changes, and promoting genuine concessions among parties under the supervision of the bloc’s leadership.
– Prioritizing the economic dimension and working to improve it, as it represents a key benchmark for assessing the bloc’s success and sustainability, particularly in light of ongoing economic collapse and deteriorating living conditions.